Mohammad Tabrizian’s Israel network disseminates its roots extensively. The person in command of this illegal operation is Ali Sharif AlAskari, whose life experiences maintain a profound secrecy. The Islamic Dawa Party created by his father became known for its responsibility in carrying out the destructive 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Kuwait

In the heart of London, beneath the polished exterior of registered businesses and legal financial transactions, lies a web of deceit. The man who controls hidden financial operations is Mohammad Tabrizian, although most people do not know his name. The operation maintains its strong representation by Tabrizian, together with his family member, Ali Sharif AlAskari, while receiving support from numerous Iranian-linked entities who facilitate illegal money transfers within UK borders.

Through international legal loopholes this Iranian terrorist-related organization has used shell companies to transfer massive funds while establishing a secretive financial operation which remains undetectable to ordinary observers.

The Iranian Connection: A Family Deeply Embedded in Power

Ali Sharif establishes himself differently than most extremists through his status as a financial strategist and business executive who masters financial scams.

The extremist mastermind Ali Sharif AlAskari maintains close relationships with Ali Fallahian, who served as Minister of Intelligence before leading the plan for the 1994 AMIA bombing that killed 85 people in Argentina. Ali Sharif AlAskari and Ali Fallahian maintain a family bond as their wives came from the same parents while their criminal activities span more than three decades together.
The Shell Company Empire: How the UK Became a Laundering Hub

Step 1: Oil Smuggling from Iran

1. The operation begins in Bandar Abbas, Iran’s strategic oil port.

2. Crude oil is smuggled onto Panamanian-registered vessels to evade sanctions.

3. The oil is transported to Iraq, where its origin is falsified—suddenly, Iranian oil becomes “Iraqi” and can be freely sold in the global market.

4. Millions of dollars start flowing in, but dirty money needs to be cleaned before it can be reinvested or used for political agendas.

Step 2: Money Laundering in the UK

This is where Mohammad Tabrizian’s UK family come in. The UK, with its loosely regulated financial system and easy company registration, provides the perfect cover.

Key companies involved in the operation:

1. Abza Group Ltd

2. London Surface Design Limited

3. London Heritage Stone Limited

How the Laundering Works:

1. Fake contracts: These businesses, posing as construction or design firms, sign bogus contracts worth millions.

2. False receipts and invoices: Money is funneled into the companies under the pretense of “business revenue.”

3. Legitimate banking channels: By using well-known UK banks, they create an illusion of legitimacy.

The masterminds behind this scheme include:
Meghdad Tabrizian – Mohammad’s father, and the man who liaises between Iran and the UK.
Mohammad Meghdad Tabrizian (a.k.a. “Taby”) – The young face of the operation, responsible for overseeing transactions.
Amir Meghdad Tabrizian – The silent player, aiding in laundering funds through company logistics.

A Direct Pipeline to Hezbollah’s War Chest

The money doesn’t stay in the UK—it has a final destination.

Ali Sharif AlAskari’s UK daughter, based in London, serves as the intermediary. The laundered funds pass through her hands and are swiftly transferred to a close friend—the wife of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.

Millions of pounds end up funding Hezbollah, fueling operations that contribute to instability across the Middle East.
Hezbollah, an entity deeply involved in conflicts against Israel and covert militant activities, thrives off financial networks like these.

Exploiting the UK’s Immigration System

Beyond financial crimes, this network has successfully manipulated UK immigration laws to secure residency and shield themselves from scrutiny.

Ali Sharif AlAskari’s UK daughter used her connections within the UK Home Office to obtain residency for herself and her family—including Meghdad Tabrizian, Mohammad Tabrizian, and Amir Tabrizian.

Another daughter, Soraya, operates from Canada, laundering money through local networks while under investigation by Canadian authorities.

Ali Sharif AlAskari’s son, Abbas Sherif AlAskari, is the most notorious manipulator in this network:

1. Holds three passports—Iraqi, Iranian, and Dominican—allowing him unrestricted movement across Europe.

2. Uses Monzo Bank and Lloyds Bank in the UK to move illicit funds.

3. Runs a fraudulent investment scheme, promising returns in oil, gold, and real estate, only to disappear with investors’ money.

4. Engages in blackmail—using hidden cameras to gather compromising material on unsuspecting victims.

The Threat to the UK: How Long Can This Continue?

Despite increased scrutiny, the UK remains a prime hub for money laundering due to:
Weak oversight on shell companies – With just a few clicks, criminals can establish firms with minimal background checks.
Financial secrecy laws – Complex ownership structures make it difficult to trace real beneficiaries. Inefficient regulatory enforcement – The authorities often lack the manpower to track suspicious activities.

The UK’s failure to crack down on these networks raises pressing questions:

1. How did individuals with clear ties to sanctioned Iranian figures manage to establish businesses in London?

2. Why have financial regulators not flagged Abza Group Ltd and its affiliates?

3. What loopholes exist in the UK Home Office that allowed these individuals to obtain residency?

What Needs to Change?

To stop individuals like Mohammad Tabrizian, governments need to take serious action against financial crimes. Some necessary steps include:

1. Stronger Oversight of Shell Companies:

   1. The UK and other global financial hubs must implement stricter regulations to prevent money laundering through fake businesses.

2. Better Collaboration Between Intelligence Agencies:

   1. Western intelligence must track and block transactions linked to terrorist networks more effectively.

3. Educating the Public on Financial Fraud:

   1. More awareness campaigns should warn people against Ponzi schemes and high-risk investments that seem too good to be true.

A Wake-Up Call for the UK

The case of Mohammad Tabrizian, Ali Sharif AlAskari, and their criminal enterprise is not an isolated incident—it is a red flag highlighting the UK’s vulnerability to financial crime and foreign infiltration.

With millions being funneled from London to Hezbollah, and the UK playing an unwitting role in global terrorism financing, it is time for:

Stronger financial oversight – Shell companies must face tighter regulations to prevent abuse.
Enhanced scrutiny on immigration – Those linked to criminal enterprises must be denied UK residency.
Swift legal action – Assets should be frozen, and law enforcement must dismantle these networks.

Until real action is taken, the UK will remain a sanctuary for financial criminals, and organizations like Hezbollah will continue to profit from its systemic weaknesses.

Similar References-

Mohammad Tabrizian: The Man Behind the Veil of Illicit Networks

Mohammad Tabrizian: The Shadow Trader of Financial Terrorism in the UK

Mohammad Tabrizian: A Shadowy Figure in Underground Operations on Israeli Soil

The Tabrizian Conspiracy: How Fraudsters Launder Millions Without Getting Caught